Friday, July 15, 2011

How al-Qaeda Sees Us..




Last week I attended a lecture by a security adviser from the RAND Corp. and I was intrigued by something he said and I would like to relay that here. The speaker discussed why it is important for us to understand the way al-Qaeda sees us and gave the following example. I would also like to touch on how and why al-Qaeda thinks they can and will defeat the US.

Before the US invasion of Iraq, but after the invasion of Afghanistan, bin Laden released a statement decrying the Bush Administration as "worse than Hulagu Khan." Most US officials shrugged this off and said, "who on earth in Hulagu Khan?" Arabs never asked who he was. For them Khan was the symbol of everything destructive and threatening to Islam. Hulagu Khan was the grandson of Genghis Khan and he conquered much of South East Asia. In 1255 Hulagu demanded that the Islamic Caliphate in Baghdad submit to the rule of the Khan's. At the time Baghdad was the center of Islamic power. The Caliphate refused to comply and the Khan rallied his army and completely sacked Baghdad and then as an act of defiance he stabled his Calvary in the most important mosque. the Khan then plundered one Muslin country after another, sacking Damascus, and marching through Palestine. He was on his was to Ciaro when a death in the Khan's royal family forced him to return home.

What is interesting about this story is that this is how bin Laden and many other Muslims view the actions of the United States. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq a picture surfaced showing US soldiers in the same mosque that Hulagu Khan had stabled his horses. This irony seemed to underscore bin Laden's claims and perpetuated the idea of the America as a destroyer of Islam. In other words many of our enemies see us as the new barbarians. This comparison is  clearly not reflected in reality, and yet it is a powerful part of their identity and political dialogue. This view also leads to the justification of terrorist attacks. Lastly, it is important for the United States to understand just how they see our actions. Not so we can accommodate them, but rather because we need to promote a counter narrative in the Arab world and utilize this understanding to defeat them. When Gen. Patton defeated Gen. Rommel in the first Allied armor victory in North Africa, Patton stood up in his jeep and said, "Rommel you glorious bastard, I read your book!" (Rommel had written a book on tank warfar) We need to be able to read al-Qaeda's book.

The next thing I would like to discuss out is how and why al- Qaeda thinks it can possibly defeat the United States. Al-Qaeda and most other Arab jihad terror groups draw on the defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan as proof of their ability to defeat the United States. From their perspective the war was dragging on between the Aghan fighter and the USSR when the Arab volunteers arrived. Despite the fact that the Arab mujaheddin were completely useless and despised by the Afghan's, Muslim Arabs saw themselves as warriors defeating a super power. When the USSR eventually withdrew from Afghanistan and shortly after collapsed, the Muslim Arabs saw this as a victory for Islam and a restoration of Arab strength.Arab Muslims bought into the fallacy that the Arab volunteers had somehow brought down the USSR. In reality it was the hard work of the Afghans, a crumbling USSR, and American stinger missiles that really defeated the USSR. Internal issues and crisis brought on the end of the USSR and nothing else. However this myth of Arab warriors in Afghanistan defeating a super power lives on. Bin Laden used to invoke the defeat of the USSR as evidence of al-Qaeda's ability to not only defeat the US but also the West in general.

The above is just two examples of al-Qaeda's thinking. I think it is good food for thought and would like to hear what you, as the reader, think about this instead of me presenting analysis. Does al-Qaeda's views surprise you? Does it play into our hand? What can we learn?

Saturday, July 2, 2011

Keys Points from the US 2011 Counter Terrorism Strategy


In June the Obama Administration published the 2011 Counterterrorism Strategy and  I have outlined what I consider to be the major points.

It is Not Over-
A reoccurring theme throughout the strategy was that the effort to defeat Al-Qaeda is not likely to be over soon. However, Al-Qaeda has been weakened and remains vulnerable.


War on Terror vs. War on Al-Qaeda-
The strategy was careful not use the term "War on Terrorism," which it considesr to be a war on a tactic rather than against the real enemy. The administration prefered to use the term "War on Al-Qaeda." This is a significant difference from the Bush administration's use of the term war on terror and effectively limits the scope of US efforts to combating Al-Qaeda affiliates and adherence.

Civil Liberties vs. Security-
A major focus of the strategy was the preservation of civil liberties.  It acknowledged that America's values are what makes the nation strong and better equipped to fight terrorism. Torture in any form was rejected as being in conflict with our values and as being an ineffective tool. Seeing so much attention given to the preservation of civil liberties is in my mind important. What remains to be seen is whether those values are upheld in practice.

Areas of Focus-
Something else important that stood out was the attention given to certain countries. Pakistan and Afghanistan still top the list of high priories, which is  unlikely to change for a long time. Other countries though, such as Yemen and Somalia, were pinpointed as countries of critical importance to defeating Al-Qaeda. Limited resources dictate that we cannot be everywhere, so focusing resources on Yemen (home to AQAP) and Somalia (home to Al-Shabaab) is wise.

International Cooperation-
Lastly, the strategy places importance on working with other nations. The US will continue to work with other nations that do not share any of our value or interests other than defeating Al-Qaeda.This is not any different than previous strategies, but bears mentioning. In essence, reality dictates these temporary alliances.


What is missing?-
While the strategy as a whole is sound and on the right track, one thing appeared to be missing to me. There is no mention of de- radicalization initiatives or whether on not the US needs to start developing one. It is implied that the US is working with global partners in their de-radicalization programs, but there is no mention of them directly. I think this issue of de-radicalization should have been mention and a need or lack of a need for a program in the US discussed briefly. Or, it could have said that the government does not view these programs as successful. Other western countries are beginning to feel the need for de-rad programs and I think that the US would be wise to articulate a position or at least see if we have a need.

Link to the 2011 Counterterrorism Strategy